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THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION:
TIME FOR LEGAL REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
While shelters for battered women spring up around the country,'
secrecy still hides the horror of marital rape from the public eye.2 Thegrim reality remains. Rape within a marriage has been legally endorsed
for more than one hundred years in America.3
1. D. MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 226 (1983). In 1981, Martin updated her book and noted
that in 1976 there appeared to be "less than a dozen refuges in the United States." Within five short
years, however, Martin could identify nearly 500 shelters for battered women. Even so, Martin
pointed out, there remains a great need for more shelters for battered women, because shelters are
overcrowded. Id at 261. Martin stressed the importance of these shelters as refuges for women and
children to escape brutality at home and argued that shelters are the "only direct, immediate, and
satisfactory solution to the problem of wife-abuse. Victims and their children need refuge from
further abuse; any other consideration-such as the need for counseling or legal advice-is of secon-
dary importance." Id at 197.
The shelters for battered women offer women protection and provide them with a haven where
they can recuperate and evaluate their situation as well as their options for the future. Victims of
domestic violence are in dire need of the support, food, shelter, encouragement, and freedom from
violence the shelters offer, but more shelters are needed today to meet these needs despite the fact
that shelters have sprung up around the country. Id at 254.
Subsequently, a recount of the number of shelters for battered women estimated that there were
about 800 in the United States in 1984, only twenty years after the first shelter for battered women
opened in Pasadena, California. O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TimF, Sept. 5, 1983, at
23, 24. O'Reilly stated that even with 800 shelters there was a waiting list at all of them and the
demand for the services shelters provide remains high. Id
The reality is evidenced in the statistics. "Nearly [six] million wives will be abused by their
husbands in any one year." Id at 23 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the National Center on Women
and Family Law estimates that one-third of the women who retreat to shelters have been sexually
assaulted by their husbands. Id at 26. The statistics, however, fail to persuade some who refuse to
believe there is such a thing as marital rape. For example, in 1979, California State Senator Bob
Wilson protested a California law allowing prosecution for marital rape and stated: "If you can't
rape your wife, who can you rape?" Id at 26.
2. See D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 181. "To date our society has refused to acknowledge
even the possibility that a wife can be raped by her husband." Id Increased awareness about rape
has come about as women have gained more equality and as women's groups have strived to bring
the public's attention to the fact that rape is not caused by the woman herself, but is the result of
violence committed upon her by a violent person. Dowd, Rape: The Sexual Weapon, TiDE, Sept. 5,
1983, at 27, 29. According to Dowd, the United States now has over 700 rape crisis centers. In
addition, the rape laws in many states have become more harsh, convictions for rape are increasing,
and judges are now more likely to give tougher sentences. Id at 27.
Even though rape is less likely to be hidden from the public today, rape is still often misunder-
stood and unreported. Id at 27. "Only 3.5% to 10% of rapes are reported, according to an aggre-
gate of surveys done by the U.S. Census Bureau, the FBI, and the National Opinion Research
Center. Using conservative estimates, experts calculate that a woman's chance of being raped at
some point during her life is an appalling [one] in [ten]." Id
3. The first United States case to accept the presumption that at common law a husband could
1
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The original rationale for exempting marital rape from punishment
has long since ebbed, but the exemption still remains. The marital rape
exemption which prevents a husband from being convicted of raping his
wife is still the rule rather than the exception in the United States4 de-
spite the twentieth century's enlightened views of marriage and female
equality.5
not rape his wife was Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857). This presump-
tion has remained in America for a long time. During the middle 1970's, the marital rape exemption
was still accepted by every state and contained in their respective statutes. Bienen, Rape III-Na-
tional Developments in Rape Reform Legilation, 6 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 170, 185 (1980). Accord
Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 VT. L. REV. 33, 33-35 (1982)
(explaining that lack of legal criticism of presumption for marital rape exemption indicates unity of
legal thought). See J. SCHWENDINGER & H. SCHWEND1NGER, RAPE AND INEQUALITY (1983), in
which the authors analyze the relationship of socioeconomic factors and the causes of rape. They
argue the incidence of rape is tied to sexual inequality and, therefore, capitalist societies have more
incidence of rape.
4. An exemption preventing a husband from being convicted of raping his wife is still the rule
rather than the exception. Only seven states have explicitly nullified the marital rape exemption.
See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text for a description of what other states have done with
the marital rape exemption in their statutes.
5. "Rape is a symptom, an effect of sexist society." B. DECKARD, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT:
POLrCAL, SOCIOECONoMIC, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL Issuns 409 (1975). According to Deckard,
rape became a major women's issue in the early 1970's which led to an increased consciousness of
rape. Id at 402. This recent increased awareness of rape is likely attributable to the slow progress of
the women's rights movement.
At least one author theorizes that the women's rights movement in America began when Fran-
ces Wright, a Scottish woman, visited the United States in 1820 and spurred men and women to
reconsider the suppressed rights of women. E. HECKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
157 (2d ed. 1972). "[IThe first Women's Rights Convention was held at Seneca Falls, New York,
July 19-20, 1848." Id at 158. Other conventions were held across the country, but in 1872, Susan
B. Anthony attempted to register to vote and was denied such a right. Id at 165-66.
The movement in the early 1900's to give women the right to vote was predominated by a
struggle to have the nineteenth amendment added to the United States Constitution. R. LEE, A
LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RiGHTS AMENDMENT 33-38 (1980). The National American Wo-
men's Suffrage Association (which later became the League of Women Voters), a conservative wo-
men's movement, originally believed the nineteenth amendment established equality for women.
The National Women's Party, a radical women's organization, saw the nineteenth amendment as
only the beginning of the equal rights struggle for women. History has proved The National Wo-
men's Party's theory, because in 1923, three years after the nineteenth amendment was added to the
United States Constitution, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was introduced in Congress. Id
at 33.
The ERA was not seriously considered by Congress until after World War II. Id. at 34. Both
in 1950 and in 1953 the Senate approved the ERA, but both times the amendment was altered to
effectively do away with the proposed -amendment. Id Finally, however, in 1972, the ERA was
passed by Congress and sent to the states for ratification. Id at 36-37. The states were given seven
years to ratify the amendment, but by March 22, 1979, the states had failed to ratify the ERA.
Subsequently, in 1978, Congress extended the time for ratification to June 30, 1982. Id at 37-38.
Since 1977, however, the ERA has faced continued opposition in regard to ratification. THE
WoMEN's MOVEMENT 179-95 (H. Gimlin ed. 1981). "Organized resistance remains strong in all
[fifteen] of the remaining states-some of which have defeated the amendment over and over-and
no consensus exists on which three states, if any, might raise the total to the required 38." Id at 179.
The ERA movement was defeated again when it failed to receive a two-thirds vote when it was
considered by the House of Representatives in November, 1984: "Equality of rights under the law
2
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This Comment will analyze: (1) common law authority for the mar-
ital rape exemption; (2) realization that marital rape is a social crisis in
America; (3) traditional policy arguments for the marital rape exemp-
tion; (4) constitutional considerations; (5) statutory responses;
(6) Oklahoma law; and (7) possible statutory reform.
II. COMMON LAW AUTHORITY
The English common law provided authority for complete spousal
immunity, but the origin of this common law is open to debate. The
basis for the marital rape exemption originated from an English jurist's
pronouncement that a husband could not be convicted for raping his
wife.6 Despite the fact that the marital rape exemption was an assertion
with no foundational judicial authority for support, this became the au-
thority for the spousal immunity in both England and the United States.7
Hale's statement was examined in State v. Smith;' the court con-
cluded it was "a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years
ago," 9 and found no authority to support it.10 This conclusion is plausi-
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." 70 A.B.A. J.
46 (Jan. 1984). From this it appears that the fu ture of the ERA is in question and that the women's
rights movement will be relegated to seeking voluntary social change rather than an amendment to
the Constitution.
6. As early as the seventeenth century, English jurist Sir Matthew Hale purported the legality
of marital rape. "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind
unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROwN 629 (Emlin ed. 1736).
According to an opinion survey commissioned by Busun;ss WEEK and performed by Louis
Harris & Associates Inc., even though there is an aura of defeat surrounding the ERA, a majority of
the American public still favors ratification of such an amendment. And, two-thirds of those who do
not favor the amendment like the goals but oppose amending the Constitution. For Most Americans,
Passage of the ERA is Just a Matter of Time, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 1983, at 92, 92-93. For a discussion
of the concerns about amending the Constitution, see Seligman, A New Era for ERA, FORTUNE,
June 27, 1983, at 55, 55-56.
It is important at the outset to note that although this Comment focuses on rape of a wife, the
author acknowledges that it is possible for a wife to rape her husband. Logically, the husband
should be afforded equal protection under the laws and he would be afforded equal protection under
a gender-neutral sexual assault statute as suggested later in the Comment.
7. Comment, Rape in Marriage The Law in Texas and the Need for Reform, 32 BAYLOR L.
REv. 109, 110 (1980); see also Regina v. Clarence, [1888] 22 Q.B.D. 23, 57 (Field, J., dissenting)
("The authority of Hale, C.J., on such a matter is undoubtedly as high as any can be, but no other
authority is cited by him for this proposition, and I should hesitate before I adopted it."); Schiff,
State of Oregon v. Rideout-Can Husband Rape Wife?, 1980 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 49, 50-51 (dic-
tum of Hale's statement incorporated in laws of American States); Comment, Spousal Exemption to
Rape, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 120, 122-23 (1981) (Hale cited no authority for his pronouncement) [here-
inafter cited as Comment, Spousal Exemption].
8. 85 NJ. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
9. Id at.., 426 A.2d at 41.
10. Id, 426 A.2d at 41.
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ble since Hale's statement was made in an era when marriages were per-
manent and wives impliedly gave their irrevocable consent to intercourse
when they exchanged marriage vows." At least one author theorized
that Hale may have created the principle in light of his demeaning con-
ception of women. 12
Furthermore, it is doubtful that Hale's statement ever became abso-
lute law in England. In fact, in Regina v. Clarence,13 the first English
case to discuss Hale's principle, several justices questioned Hale's ration-
ale. This indicated that Hale's principle had not been sanctioned as part
of the English common law. 4 The court, however, because the case was
not a rape case, did not rule on the validity of Hale's statement. 5 In-
deed, Hale's principle was not relied upon until 1949 in Rex v. Clarke.16
The holding in Clarke7 was subsequently followed in Regina v. Miller,'8
a11953 case. In Miller, the couple had been living apart and the wife had
filed for divorce, but because no court order nor mutual separation agree-
ment existed at the time, the Court found that the wife's consent had not
been revoked.' 9 A more recent English decision, Regina v. O'Brien,2 °
also impliedly accepted Hale's authority when it held that a provisional
divorce decree cancelled the wife's consent.2'
These English cases demonstrate that the marital rape exemption
was not absolute in England. English common law presumed a wife im-
pliedly consents to sexual intercourse with her husband; it also provided
the wife with a revocable consent. Revocation of a wife's consent was
11. Id at , 426 A.2d at 42. See generally Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 3.
FAm. L. 423, 424-29 (1983-1984) (exploring the common law background of marriage contracts).
Marriages in Hale's time were controlled by the church and could only be dissolved by death or
voided by an act of Parliament. Regina v. Miller, [1953] 2 Q.B. 282, 286.
12. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, WhofmJ Can You Rape?" The Marital Rape
Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 (1981-1982). Hale did not cite any authority to sup-
port the marital rape exemption, which was contrary to his practice, and there was evidence of
contrary authority at the time. Id
13. [1888] 22 Q.B.D. 23.
14. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389,_., 315 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1984); see also Kizer v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984) (this case cited Weshaupt and narrowed its
holding).
15. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at -, 315 S.E.2d at 851.
16. [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (court found separation order had revoked the implied consent nor-
mally found between a husband and wife regarding sexual relations).
17. Id
18. [1954] 2 All E.R. 529 (court ruled Miller could not be prosecuted for rape because the
marriage was not destroyed even though a petition for divorce had been filed). It is interesting to
note that both Miller and Clarke presume there is a marital rape exemption and fail to discuss it. As
a result, England's recent case law on the subject is sparse.
19. Id at 533.
20. [1974] 3 All E.R. 663.
21. Id
[Vol. 21:353
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 21 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss2/4
MARITAL RAPE
strictly limited and as a prerequisite required a mutual separation agree-
ment or a court-ordered separation.22 Thus, "under English common
law, there never existed an absolute irrevocable marital [rape] exemption
that would protect a husband from a charge of rape in all
circumstances.
' 2 3
Early American cases did follow the English case law, but did not
follow the exceptions which allowed a wife's consent to be revoked. In
1857, a Massachusetts court stated in Commonwealth v. Fogerty,24 appar-
ently the first American court to consider the Hale doctrine, that mar-
riage was a defense to the charge of rape.2" In 1905, a Texas case, Frazier
v. State,26 carried Hale's principle further and stated, consent is that
"which she gives when she assumes the marriage relation, and which the
law will not permit her to retract in order to charge her husband with the
offense of rape."27
Similarly, both the English and the early American courts followed
the Hale doctrine without analyzing or investigating its authority. More-
over, the courts ignored Sir William Blackstone's treatise on common
law crimes in which rape was defined as "raptus mulierum, or the carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will. ' 28 Clearly, this
common law definition did not include an express nor an implied marital
rape exemption. More importantly, Blackstone's definition was not ex-
amined by the early courts as an alternative to Hale's assertion.
New rationales were used to support Hale's principle after it was
discovered that the principle lacked legal foundation. As a result, much
of the early courts' logic rested on the presumption that rape was un-
wanted, unlawful sex, and since intercourse between husband and wife
was legal and presumably desired, a husband could not legally rape his
wife. Other jurists preferred the theory that a woman was her husband's
chattel and he could do whatever he liked with her.29 As a consequence,
these archaic justifications for the marital rape exemption endured in
America for decades.
22. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at _, 315 S.E.2d at 852.
23. Id. at - 315 S.E.2d at 852 (emphasis added).
24. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857).
25. Ia
26. 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905). The court refused to grant a divorce to the wife so
she remained in the same household, but did not sleep with her husband. Although the couple was
separated for all practical purposes, the husband was afforded the privilege of the marital rape ex-
emption. Id at ., 86 S.W. at 754-55.
27. Id at _, 86 S.W. at 755.
28. 4 W. BLAcKsroNF, COMMrNTARIBS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1850).
29. Annot., 24 A.L.R.4th 105, 109 (1983).
1985]
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III. THE REALIZATION THAT RAPE IS A SOCIAL CRISIS
These archaic and poorly reasoned rationales supporting the use of
Hale's principle by early English and American courts seem anachronis-
tic in the progressive atmosphere of the twentieth century. Indeed, the
women's rights movement and the increased awareness of rape in general
have roused courts to reexamine marital rape exemptions. In the 1960's
the women's movement gained momentum30 and by the early 1970's 1 an
increased consciousness concerning battered women came to the fore-
front and revealed a dire need for shelters and most importantly compas-
sion for battered women. "No mere accident, this groundswell was the
result of the changing political consciousness and organizing activity of
women." 32 In contrast, a similar concern for marital rape victims failed
to materialize.
At the same time that battles for equal pay, equal opportunity, relief
from sexual harassment, and the right to abortion raged-the marital
rape issue was surprisingly ignored. This ignorance was fostered, in large
part, by both the failure to report marital rape incidents to authorities
and the afflicted wives' fear of reprisal. Indeed, marital rape was not a
crime in most states, thus, women had no legal motivation to report it,
especially if it would expose their marital problems or if they were unsure
whether they could legally prove a rape had occurred.33 As a result,
marital rape was of little concern to those unfamiliar with the violence
and still remains to a large extent unpunished because our society34 ig-
nores the fact that a husband can physically rape his wife even if he can-
not legally be convicted for doing so in most states.
Although society ignores the fact a husband can physically rape his
wife, the definition of rape does not: "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with
30. Saltzman, Women and Victimization: The Aftermath, in 3 SAGE YEARBOOmS IN WOMEN'S
PoLIcy STuDiEs 269, 269-70 (J. Chapman & M. Gates ed. 1978).
31. S. ScHEcHTsR, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 29-43 (1982).
32. Id at 29; see Schulman, The Marital Rape Exemption in the Criminal Law, 14 CLEARiNo-
HOUSE REV. 538 (1980). Schulman explains why wife-beating was once accepted in America.
33. Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 1088, 1090 (1980).
34. Such is not the case in all countries. In Russia authorities are quick to punish a husband for
mistreating his wife. A husband can receive a two-week jail term for "gross behavior" toward his
wife on her word alone. He can receive a three to seven-year sentence for rape of his wife just on her
word also. See D. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 182. The consensus in Russia and that found in crimi-
nal codes of Communist block countries, Sweden, and Denmark is simply-rape is rape no matter
who the victim happens to be. Id
For a discussion of the movement in Britain against marital rape, see R. HALL, S. JAMES & J.
KERTEZ, THE RAPIST WHo PAYS THE RENT (1981). The book is a response by a women's organi-
zation to the working papers of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in Britain.
[Vol. 21:353
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a female without her consent."3 Moreover, several courts and scholars
have determined rape to be sexual intercourse without consent. Also,
these courts have rejected the marital rape exemption purported by the
Hale principle. Rape, however, is not a crime of sex: rape is a crime of
violence. It is the violence, outrage, and injury to the victim, not the sex,
which demands criminal punishment.
The essence of rape is its violent nature; the coercion by the forceful
penetration and threats against another's will.36 The understanding of
rape as violence is tantamount to resolving the central issue of whether
the crime of marital rape should be penalized. If rape is not a crime of
intercourse but of "injury and outrage to the feelings of the woman by
the forceful penetration of her person"' 37 it is not the intercourse that
should be punished, but the violence. Indeed, modem writers on the sub-
ject agree that the greatest harm of rape is the psychological injury, in
addition to the physical injuries, resulting from the domination and de-
nial of freedom.38
A married woman certainly relinquishes some autonomy, but she
does not consent to any and all acts of sexual intercourse which her hus-
band demands and she most certainly does not exchange her autonomy
for a license by her husband to commit violence upon her body.39 It is
this violence for which the crime of marital rape should be punished.'
Violence and marriage are strange bedfellows, but several studies have
35. BLACK'S LAW DicnONARY 1134 (5th ed. 1979). The first definition of rape contained
therein. A second definition is also helpful. "The unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by a man
forcibly and against her will." Id.
36. Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Wyo. 1979); Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338
Mass. 377, - 155 N.E.2d 187, 191-92, cerL denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959); see also State v. Rider,
449 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Florida's sexual battery statute "proscribes a crime of
violence, not a crime of sex"), reh'g denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (1984), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1830
(1985); State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court stated purpose of
Florida's sexual battery statute was to "protect both males and females from sexual violence, i.e., a
crime of violence and not a crime of sex"). See generally Hil, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16
NEW ENG. L. REv. 31, 40 (1980) (describes the harm of rape as an invasion of privacy, not merely
"genital contact").
37. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. at , 155 N.E.2d at 191-92.
38. See Hilf, supra note 36, at 40-41.
Some of the variables that describe rape's violence are: beating, brutal beating, physical force,
threats, coercion, intimidation with a weapon or object, choking, and roughness. T. MCCAnLL, L.
MEYER & A. FiscHMAN, THE AFrERMATH OF RAPE 61-62 (1979).
"If rape constitutes an invasion of the victim's territorial rights over her own body, a brutal rape
must be a double invasion. The victim must deal not only with the sexual and aggressive aspects of
rape but also with a reinforced sense of her own mortality and vulnerability. A brutal rape is likely
to shatter the victim's basic sense of trust and security in herself and her environment." Id. at 62.
39. Ia at 41.
40. Florida's sexual battery statute was drafted "to protect both males and females from sexual
violence, i.e., a crime of violence and not a crime of sex." Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1128.
1985]
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revealed that most battered women have also been sexually assaulted,
often because the wife conceded to intercourse in order to avoid being
beaten." Even though the idea is extremely revolting, violence and mar-
riage do collide behind closed doors in our society.4 2
The elements of the crime of rape also demonstrate that rape is vio-
lence because the elements require both force and lack of consent. There
are three essential elements of rape and a fourth which is often included
in the marital rape exemption. The traditional elements of the common
law crime of rape include: (1) carnal knowledge, penetration, or inter-
course; (2) force; and (3) nonconsent.43 The fourth element some courts
included was that the victim could not be the wife of the perpetrator.'
Later cases, however, have held nonmarriage to the perpetrator was not a
separate element, but an evidentiary matter bearing on the relevancy of
the woman's lack of consent.4"
This change in the elements of the common law crime of rape indi-
cate that America's marital rape exemption is eroding because new ratio-
nales have been considered. For example, in 1904, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court originally held that it must be proved that the prosecu-
trix was not the defendant's wife.' 6 Subsequently, the circumstantial evi-
dence burden was eased.47 For many years, however, the fact that
prosecutrix and defendant were not married was very important, even if
later this fact was only necessary as evidence to prove there was consent
to the common law crime of rape.
41. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 4-5.
42. The fact that violence in marriage occurs today is not so surprising when the high divorce
rate in America is considered. There are 84 divorced persons for every 1,000 persons who are
married and unseparated. WOMmN's Rrs. TASK FORCE OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUMCE, WOMEN'S
Rrs. iN THE U.S. OF AM., 3-13 (March 1979) [hereinafter cited as WoMEN's RTS. TASK FORCE].
"In the seven years since 1970, the divorce ratio has increased 79 percent, compared with an increase
of 34 percent during the entire period from 1960 to 1970. Women are more likely to be divorced
than men-l01 per 1,000 as compared to 66 per 1,000 men." Id at 3.
43. State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, _ 560 P.2d 925, 931 (1977); see also State v. Smith, 85 N.J.
193, -, 426 A.2d 38, 40 (1981) (husband's forcible intercourse with wife not rape since all three
elements were not satisfied).
44. Eg., People v. Henry, 142 Cal. App. 2d 114, ., 298 P.2d 80, 84 (1956).
45. See Bell, 90 N.M. at _ 560 P.2d at 931-33 (court stated at common law it was never
necessary to prove victim was not the wife of the perpetrator); see also State v. Brown, 100 N.M. 726,
676 P.2d 253, 255 (1984) (test is whether substantial evidence exists to support a guilty verdict as
to every element essential to a conviction).
46. Brenton v. Territory, 15 Okla. 6, 78 P. 83 (1904); accord Emyahtubby v. State, 14 Okla.
Crim. 213, 216, 169 P. 1124, 1125 (1918) ('one of the material averments. . . is that the prosecutrix
was not the wife of the defendant.") (quoting Brenton).
47. Ellis v. State, 87 Okla. Crim.' 108, 110-11, 194 P.2d 229, 230-31 (1948); Jarrard v. State, 87
Okla. Crim. 89, 92, 194 P.2d 227, 229 (1948). In Ellis, the fact of nonmarriage was proved by the
prosecutrix's admission that she was "Miss Sena Taylor." Ellis, 87 Okla. Crim. at 110, 194 P.2d at
230.
[Vol. 21:353
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Thus, the marital rape exemption for the crime of rape went virtu-
ally unchallenged for years. In the late 1970's, however, America's com-
mon law marital rape exemption began to erode. In State v. Smith,48 the
New Jersey Supreme Court leveled an unprecedented attack on the com-
mon law marital rape exemption. The court stated: "[T]he rule, formu-
lated under vastly different conditions, need not prevail when those
conditions have changed."'49 Although the court expressed a strong dis-
approval of the common law exemption, it correctly relegated its aboli-
tion to the state legislature.50
Two prior court decisions were also instrumental in the movement
away from strict adherence to the common law rape elements. First,
spousal rape became a legally contested issue in 1978 when Greta
Rideout filed criminal charges against her husband for marital rape.51
The importance of this case was not Rideout's acquittal, but the far-
reaching publicity it brought to Oregon's law which had previously aban-
doned the husband's immunity for spousal rape.52 Of even greater im-
portance to the legal community, however, was Commonwealth v.
Chretien.53 In Chretien, a husband was convicted of raping his wife
while the two were living apart and a final divorce decree was pending.
54
The statute examined by the court did not specifically refer to the marital
rape exemption, so the court applied the common law elements. The
court held that the common law applied to husbands only when the mar-
riage relationship had been severed by a divorce judgment nisi. There-
fore, if the marriage had been severed a husband could be convicted for
marital rape.55
America's most recent move away from the common law's absolute
48. 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
49. Id. at., 426 A.2d at 42.
50. The court stated it "lack[ed] the authority to simply ignore the settled principles of law that
bind [it] and depart from the common law rule, because, in [its] judgment it is unfair and discrimina-
tory .... " Id at - 426 A.2d at 43.
51. State v. Rideout, (Or. Cir. Ct., Dec. 27, 1978), 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2164 (1978). See
generally When a Wife Says No... Beyond the Rideout Case, Ms., Apr. 1982, at 23. "Greta Rideout
was the first woman in the United States whose husband was charged with a rape occurring while
they were living together." Id at 23. Naturally, many were sceptical of Greta Rideout's complaint
when the couple "reunited" after Rideout was acquitted. A few months later, however, Greta
Rideout divorced her husband. Yet, the divorce and later conviction for breaking into her house and
harassing her failed to deter John Rideout from further attacks against his former wife. Id The
Rideout case graphically portrays the need for conviction and punishment of spouses who rape. See
Starr & King, Rape and the Law, NEWSWvEEK, May 20, 1985, at 60.
52. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 23.
53. 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
54. Id at . 417 N.E.2d at 1205-06.
55. Id at , 417 N.E.2d at 1210.
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marital rape exemption occurred in 1983 when a New York court struck
down New York's statutory marital rape exemption because it violated
equal protection rights guaranteed in both the state and federal constitu-
tions.56 Similarly, in People v. Liberta," the New York Court of Appeals
held that New York's rape statute violated equal protection."8
The reasoning of these recent cases demonstrate that the common
law marital rape exemption is slowly beginning to erode. The traditional
policy justifications are being recognized as archaic in our enlightened
society. Thus, a further breakdown is likely to occur as the traditional
policy arguments for retaining the marital rape exemption are rejected.
IV. TRADITIONAL POLICY ARGUMENTS
Several traditional policy arguments have been advanced to support
the common law marital rape exemption. However, no formal capsuliza-
tion of the justifications exists and as a result courts have asserted various
arguments to support the exemption. 9 While the Model Penal Code
(MPC) ° drafters reasoned that a husband's immunity rests in the his-
toric concept of the wife being the father's or husband's chattel, the MPC
illustrates that this rationale has recently come under attack.61 Of
course, there are also many other rationales underlying the marital rape
exemption.62 This Comment analyzes the traditional rationales which
56. People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
57. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 474 N.E.2d 567 (1984). Liberta was the first man to be
convicted of raping his wife in the state of New York. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1983, at 24, col. 6.
Liberta received a sentence of three to nine years in prison. Id.
58. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at _, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12, 474 N.E.2d at 571-72.
59. Smith, 85 N.J. at _, 426 A.2d at 43-44 (court surmised the common law was likely based
on three justifications: (1) woman was chattel of husband; (2) husband and wife were one person;
and (3) upon marriage the wife impliedly consented to sexual intercourse with her husband); see also
Rider, 449 So. 2d at 906 (attempts to rationalize the exemption include: (1) wife is chattel of hus-
band; (2) wife and husband are one; and (3) with marriage a woman consents to sexual intercourse);
People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (statute's marital rape exemption justified be-
cause marital exemption may promote resumption of normal marital relations and because marital
rape exemption prevents problems of proof inherent in marital rape).
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
61. Id. In early times the wife was to be submissive to her husband because she vowed "under
oath to love, honor, and obey and therefore obliged to do the husband's bidding." AL
62. See generally M. Rickenberg & I. Schulman, Florida, New York, and Virginia Courts De-
clare Marital Rape a Crime, 18 CLEARiNGHOuS REV. 745, 746 (1984) (analyzes policy arguments
asserted in De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d at 117, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 510). See Barry, supra note 33, at 1089(restraining vengeful wives is primary justification); Harman, supra note 11, at 425-27 (the concept
of a woman as her husband's property was abolished with the Married Women's Property Acts;
notion that women impliedly consent to sexual intercourse upon demand is no longer meaningful);
Comment, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV.
201, 205-12 (courts have recognized four theories, none of which are viable today: (1) when a wo-
man marries she consents to sexual relations; (2) wife has alternative remedies; (3) state should not
10
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various courts and commentators have asserted in the last century.
A. The Marriage Contract Implies Permanent Consent
The rationale that the marriage contract implies permanent consent
to sexual relations is the most commonly used justification.6 3 Surpris-
ingly, even in light of the movement for women's equality, a 1984 Vir-
ginia Supreme Court decision 6 invoked the theory that a wife impliedly
consents to sexual intercourse when she marries her husband.65 The
court held that a wife must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she
revoked her implied consent through a "manifest intent 'to terminate the
marital relationship.' '66 Several other courts have also specifically up-
held the common law elements of rape on the grounds that a husband
cannot rape his wife because she is "irrebuttably presumed to consent to
sexual relations with her husband, even if forcible and without her
consent."'67
A fundamental observation should be noted when examining the
holdings which found an implied consent doctrine--all of the holdings
were in rape cases. None of these cases asserting a husband cannot rape
his wife because a wife consents to sexual intercourse with her husband
upon marriage cite any decisions outside the rape context which hold
that marriage is a contract for sexual intercourse upon demand.68 This
contradicts the fact that excessive sexual demands have been sufficient
grounds for granting divorce,69 and more contradictory are holdings
which grant a divorce because the husband abused his right to sexual
intercourse with his wife.70
intervene in marriage relationships; and (4) fabricated charges would result); Comment, Spousal
Exemption, supra note 7, at 113-18 (marriage is permanent consent to sexual relations; state should
not intervene; problems with proof insurmountable; fabricated charges would result; other remedies
are available; equal punishment for husbands and strangers convicted of rape is unfair).
63. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 474 N.E.2d at 573; Clancy, Equal Protec-
tion Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclusion, 16 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 2-4 n.4 (1980).
64. Kizer v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
65. Id at , 321 S.E.2d at 293.
66. Ia at , 321 S.E.2d at 293-94 (court held a wife can revoke her implied consent to marital
sex where such revocation was shown by living separately and manifestation by the wife that she
believed the marriage had ended).
67. State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, - 560 P.2d 925, 931 (1977); see Duggins v. State, 76 Okla.
Crim. 168, 135 P.2d 347 (1943); Frazier, 48 Tex. Crim. at . 86 S.W. at 755 (wife gives husband
matrimonial consent to sexual intercourse which the law will not permit her to retract).
68. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 311 (1977).
69. Diehl v. Diehl, 188 Pa. Super. 491, 149 A.2d 133 (1959); see also Comment, Spousal Ex-
emption, supra note 7, at 124.
70. Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 571, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921) ("ungoverned lust" equalled
"personal violence... and cannot be justified under the claim of the exercise of his marital rights").
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Logically, even if one accepts the implied consent theory, it is unrea-
sonable to assume the wife also consents to both violence and injury.71
And, even if this argument were accepted, it is quite probable that im-
plied consent to sexual relations in marriage violates the individual right
of liberty.7
2
Thus, for many varied reasons scholars have rejected the implied
consent rationale. Most writers emphasize the unreasonableness of infer-
ring from the consent doctrine that a wife impliedly agrees to sexual in-
tercourse with her husband upon demand. 73 Granted, both the wife and
husband agree to have intercourse as part of the marriage consumma-
tion, but their personal sexual autonomy is not completely
extinguished.74
Likewise, a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Wachtler of the New
York Court of Appeals in Liberta75 found the implied consent doctrine
which emanates from Hale's principle to be "untenable. ' 76 Rape is not
merely intercourse, but a "degrading, violent act which violates the bod-
ily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting phys-
ical and psychic harm."77 Thus, to imply that a wife impliedly consents
to such a violent act is unreasonable.78 Moreover, the consent doctrine
effectively gives a husband the opportunity to take the law into his own
hands with violence and force in order to make his wife comply with her
alleged "implied consent" when he should peacefully seek a divorce or
other similar relief in domestic courts.7 9
The argument that a husband should seek judicial remedies is also
consistent with contract law. A contract, as a marriage is in some re-
spects,"0 requires "mutual expressions of assent to the exchange."81 A
71. See Note, supra note 68, at 312. A state has an interest in protecting the personal safety of
its citizens and generally will reject any suggestion of implied consent to serious bodily harm. Id at
312-13.
72. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389,., 315 S.E.2d 847, 854 (1984). Attorney Gen-
eral argued "blanket consent to sexual intercourse implied from marriage runs counter to the Bill of
Rights in that it impinges upon individual liberty," but the court did not have to go that far to reach
its decision. Ia at - 315 S.E.2d at 854.
73. Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1954).
"By marrying she indicates that usually she will consent to intercourse, but she also probably be-
lieves that she can expressly decline the act at any given time." Ia
74. Ia
75. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 152, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 207, 474 N.E.2d at 567.
76. Ia at 164, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 474 N.E.2d at 573.
77. Ia, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 474 N.E.2d at 573.
78. Id, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 474 N.E.2d at 573.
79. Smith, 85 N.J. at 206, 426 A.2d at 44.
80. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 14.
81. CORBIN ON CoNTRreAcrS § 107 (one volume ed. 1952).
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wife, however, would be astonished to think in agreeing to intercourse
she also agreed to any violence or force to which her husband may sub-
ject her. Indeed, it is doubtful there would ever be an objective manifes-
tation of consent to abuse. And, if there is no objective manifestation of
consent "the court will not hold a party bound by a contract varying
from his own understanding unless his words and conduct were such that
he had reason to know that the other party would be and was in fact
misled."82 Thus, when there is no objective manifestation of consent, as
would be lacking between a husband and wife with respect to violence
and rape, there is no enforceable contract. A wife cannot impliedly con-
sent when there is no underlying contract or offer of agreement from
which to imply the consent. But, even if she could impliedly consent, the
husband's remedy for a breach of contract would be in the form of dam-
ages, not a "forced [specific] performance.""3
The implied consent theory is a legal fiction and there is a lack of
authority explaining why such consent was necessarily irrevocable. In
fact, "it should not follow that consent can never be withdrawn so long
as the marriage, in its technical sense, exists."84 When the husband and
wife are separated the implied consent doctrine becomes irrelevant, be-
cause it is groundless to argue that the wife's implied consent still exists
to have sexual intercourse with a man, her husband, with whom she no
longer cohabits.85 Fortunately, many state statutes uphold a wife's revo-
cation of consent when the couple has severed their union, but the re-
quirements needed to establish revocation of consent and separation vary
from state to state.86
82. Id. (no agreement exists if both parties did not understand the terms of the agreement).
"The whole idea of viewing the marriage agreement in strict contract terms, with consent to on-
demand sex as part of it, is ludicrous when taken to the extreme." Comment, Spousal Exemption,
supra note 7, at 125.
83. See Barry, supra note 33, at 1088 (husband should seek legal remedies for a breach of an
implied contract, not violent enforcement unilaterally); Comment, The Common Law Does Not Sup-
port a Marital Exception for Forcible Rape, 5 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 181, 184-85 (1979) (because
people are not allowed to enforce their own contracts, the marital rape exemption cannot be justified
even if contract law was applicable).
84. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1129.
85. See Note, supra note 68, at 313.
86. Glasgow, The Marital Rape Exemption: LegalSanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J. FAM. L. 565,
569 (1979-1980) (because law now allows separation and divorce it "also recognizes that a wife's
consent may be effectively revoked"); see also infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (listing
states that require revocation of consent and separation before a wife can bring rape charges against
her husband).
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B. A Wife is the Property of Her Husband
The theory that a wife is the property of her husband was another
justification used to support the common law marital rape exemption.17
The common law concept that a wife is the property of her husband with
which he can do as he pleases is no longer accepted by our society.88
Today women can own and control property separately from their hus-
bands.89 Ironically, "[plublic policy seeking to uphold the marital rela-
tionship does not see as detrimental to that relationship the recognition
of rights in married women over their property." 90 Thus, it would logi-
cally follow that public policy which supports the marriage relationship
must necessarily extend to the woman's right to control her body.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court affirmed the enlightened principle
that women are no longer property and/or chattels of men in Trammel v.
United States.9 In Trammel, the defendant asserted that he was privi-
leged to prevent his wife from testifying against him.92 Trammel further
contended that the lower court erred in allowing his wife to testify over
his objection.93 In so arguing, the defendant relied on the Hawkins rule94
87. Smith, 85 NJ. at ._, 426 A.2d at 43-44; see Note, supra note 68, at 309. When rape laws
originated a woman was property of her father or husband, and some commentators assert that rape
laws were designed to ensure her value as a sexual object for her husband or future mate. Note,
supra note 68, at 309.
88. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at , 315 S.E.2d at 852-53 (court deemed this idea so archaic that it
did not require citation to authority to prove "that these views of the dependence of women have
long been cast aside.").
89. Initially America adopted the English common law system which provided that a wife's
property became the property of her husband upon marriage and thereafter he had absolute control
over her property. WOMEN'S Ris. TAsK FORCE, supra note 42, at 4. In 1809, Connecticut was the
first state to give married women the right to dispose of their property by will. Later, all of the states
adopted "Married Women's Property Acts" or "Married Women's Emancipation Acts" giving mar-
ried women equal rights to control their property. Id. at 4.
90. Scutt, Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage Contract, 3 MONAsH U.L. REv. 255,
270 (1977).
91. 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) ("[n]owhere in the common-law world-indeed in any modem soci-
ety-is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (the erosion of this older view of women may explain why rape is
coming under attack).
See generally United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1984) (spousal privilege is
optional); Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980) (court of appeals reversed order finding
appellant in contempt of court for refusing to answer questions about her husband posed by a grand
jury); Young v. State, 603 S.W.2d 851, 853 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (in Texas, a spouse may not
be called to testify against their spouse in a criminal action); Brown v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 601,
292 S.E.2d 319 (1982) (husband and wife are competent to be witnesses against their spouses unless
otherwise disqualified).
92. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42.
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id
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which permitted a defendant "to exclude" all adverse spousal testimony.
The Court, however, rejected the archaic notion that the wife was a hus-
band's chattel9" and modified the Hawkins rule so that it was in the sole
discretion of the witness to decide whether or not to testify against their
spouse.96
Thus, the theory that a wife is the property of her husband is no
longer accepted in American jurisprudence. Logically, it should also
cease to be a justification for the marital rape exemption. This is espe-
cially true since the corresponding interspousal immunity in tort law is
also eroding.97 Moreover, because the view of women as the chattel of
men has been relegated to history in American case law and in much of
America's tort law, it follows that rape laws should also change from
protecting a man's property interests to guarding a woman's safety and
privacy interests.
C. Husband and Wife United as One
Another traditional justification for the marital rape exemption is
that when a husband and wife marry they become one.98 Therefore, a
husband cannot be guilty of rape because he cannot be guilty of raping
himself. This is fallacious on its face. In 1765, Blackstone explained the
principle: "The very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she per-
forms every thing... ."99 This concept, however, has been abolished in
95. Id. at 51-52.
96. Id. at 53. The purpose of modifying the Hawkins rule was "so that the witness-spouse alone
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled nor foreclosed
from testifying." Id.
97. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORs 863-64 (4th ed. 1971). In sixteen states the general rule
of complete interspousal immunity has been rejected. Id. at 863. "Thus recovery has been permitted
for intentional physical attacks, on the ground that 'the peace and harmony of the home has been so
damaged that there is no danger that it will be further impaired.' ... This is fully borne out by the
fact that several jurisdictions, with the unanimous approval of legal writers, have followed the lead
of a noted dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, have rejected all arguments in justification of the
immunity as specious, have thrown it completely overboard, and have construed the Married Wo-
men's Acts to authorize an action by either spouse for a personal tort committed by the other,
whether it be intentional or negligent in character." Id. at 863-64 (footnotes omitted); see also Im-
mer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). "But we ought not continue to maintain a doctrine
for fear of an unhappy consequence when what knowledge we have tells us our fear may not be
justified." Risko, 56 N.J. at , 267 A.2d at 487.
98. See Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1128; Note, supra note 68, at 310.
99. See 4 W. BLACKsrONE, supra note 28, at 442 (emphasis in original); H. CLARK, LAW OF
DoMEsric RELATiONS iN THE UNITED STATES 219 (1968).
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most states. 100
D. The Marital Rape Exemption Promotes Spousal Reconciliation
Among the more recent justifications suggested for the marital rape
exemption is that allowing a wife to bring criminal charges against her
husband for rape would impede any possibility of reconciling the mar-
riage.101 This argument, too, is fallacious on its face because it is the
violence resulting from the rape, not the wife's attempt to find protection
under the law, which unravels a marriage.'02 Moreover, sexual inter-
course has become a violent nightmare for the wife it is likely that there
is but a shred of the marriage left to reconcile anyway. 0 3 If the wife has
resigned herself to bringing criminal charges against her husband despite
the humiliation she will undoubtedly suffer, then it is unlikely that a rec-
onciliation could occur.' 4
The converse rationale offered by those asserting that the marital
rape exemption promotes reconciliation rests on the tenet that "the wife
will be soothed by denying her the protection of the criminal laws
.... 105 More importantly, this tenuous theory ignores the probability
that the wife might be fearful of her husband and not bring criminal rape
charges until they were separated." 6
The states have an interest in the physical protection of individuals
as well as the family. The state's interest in protecting personal liberty is
not furthered by the marital rape exemption. Moreover, while family
harmony is the justification for the marital rape exemption, family har-
mony has never been subordinate to a child's personal well-being. This is
exemplified by the fact that a man could be convicted for raping his
daughter.' 7 If the state's interest in the family was held more highly
than its interest in personal autonomy, then rape of any family member
would be a crime, but it is not.
This policy argument, that without the marital rape exemption all
possibilities of reconciling the marriage would be destroyed, assumes that
100. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1128; see Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969).
101. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Comment, supra note
83, at 185; Note, supra note 68, at 315.
102. Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Weishaupt, 227 Va. at
315 S.E.2d at 855.
103. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52; Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d
at 574; Note, supra note 68, at 315.
104. Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
105. Note, supra note 68, at 315; Comment, supra note 73, at 725.
106. See Note, supra note 68, at 315-16.
107. Wood v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 364, 368, 116 P.2d 728, 730 (1941).
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there remains a marriage to be reconciled. Furthermore, it assumes that
the violence of rape is an injury to which a wife can recover and adjust.
Yet, even if a marriage could be reconciled and the perpetrator forgiven,
it does not necessarily follow that a wife who declines reconciliation
should be prevented from charging her husband with rape.l08
E. The State Should Not Interfere with Marital Relationships
As noted above, the state has an interest in maintaining family har-
mony and another justification set forth for the marital rape exemption is
that the state should not interfere with the marital relationship. The as-
sertion that the state's interest in promoting family harmony comes
before that of protecting individuals is illogical. Although promoting
harmony in marriage is a legitimate state interest, "there is no rational
relation between allowing a husband to forcibly rape his wife and these
interests."109 It is incredulous to suggest that allowing violence within
the family furthers marital privacy," 0 when in reality allowing marital
rape probably fosters unhappy marriages.
Logically, because a husband cannot invoke his right to marital pri-
vacy to elude a charge of battery for beating his wife, he should also be
prevented from escaping liability for raping his wife under the right to
marital privacy."' As Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman,"2 - the family is sacred, but it is not beyond regulation
108. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 20; Comment, supra note 83, at 185.
109. Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
110, The right to privacy within a marriage was designed to protect consensual acts, not vio-
lence. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to use contraceptives
fell within the penumbra of the right of privacy emanating from the Bill of Rights); accord, Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Martin v. Covington, 541 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D. Ky.
1982); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (private sexual activities
are within the penumbra of privacy); Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740, 750 (W.D. Wis. 1974) ("the
decision whether to become pregnant as a result of sexual intercourse is a fundamental right for
women, married and unmarried"); Warner v. State, 489 P.2d 526, 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
(Court stated Griswold "does not prohibit the state's regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct
between non-married persons.").
111. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574. "The fact that rape
statutes exist, however, is a recognition that the harm caused by a forcible rape is different, and more
severe, than the harm caused by ordinary assault... ..." Id. at 166, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474
N.E2d at 574.
112. 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, I., dissenting). Justice Harlan went on to say: 'Thus, I
would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal
enquiry, however privately practiced." Id; accord, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944). "But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of
religious liberty." Id at 166; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). Admittedly, however, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that there is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince, 321 U.S. at
17
Coen: The Marital Rape Exemption: Time for Legal Reform
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
"and it would be an absurdity to suggest either that offenses may not be
committed in the bosom of the family or that the home can be made a
sanctuary for crime." '113
F. The Marital Rape Exemption Eliminates Fabricated Charges
Another commonly asserted policy argument is that abolishing the
marital rape exemption would encourage fabricated rape charges.1 14 The
fear is that if a divorce is pending, the possibility for bringing a charge of
rape against the husband would give women great power and wives
would not forego the opportunity to retaliate.' 15 The evidence against
this proposition is overwhelming. First, the possibility that married wo-
men will file false charges is no greater than the possibility that unmar-
ried women will do so." 6 Second, our judicial system is capable of
determining and dismissing fabricated charges. 7 Third, false charges
can be asserted for any crime. If the possibility of false charges prevents
imposition of a crime for marital rape, the possibility of false charges
could also be asserted to defeat the imposition of any crime."1 8 Fourth,
rape trials are extremely embarrassing for the victim and the stigma of
the rape trial often remains for life." 9 Therefore, it logically follows that
a revengeful wife would seek a less shameful, embarrassing, and self-in-
criminating alternative for her retaliation.' More convincingly, the of-
fense of battery can be exerted against one's spouse but has not been used
for retaliation. 2' Finally, abuse of the opportunity to charge husbands
with rape has not occurred in jurisdictions that have abrogated the mari-
tal rape exemption.' 22 It should be noted that a gender-neutral rape or
166; see, eg. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
113. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552.
114. See Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Smith, 401 So. 2d
at 1129; Barry, supra note 33, at 1091.
115. See Barry, supra note 33, at 1091.
116. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Note, supra note 68, at
314.
117. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 166, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 215, 474 N.E.2d at 575.
118. See Comment, supra note 83, at 183; see also Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 166, 485 N.Y.S.2d at
215, 474 N.E.2d at 575; Comment, Spousal Exemption, supra note 7, at 126.
119. See Note, supra note 68, at 314-15. Suggestion that wives would bring fabricated charges
"demonstrates little understanding of the human psyche, and the natural shame and embarrassment
that would attend any revelation of a rape by one's husband." Comment, Spousal Exemption, supra
note 7, at 126 (citing S. BRow~sILER, AGtANsr OuR WILL (1975)).
120. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 53-54; Note, supra note 68, at 315.
121. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1129.
122. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 19.
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sex offense statute would eliminate this problem altogether by treating
both men and women equally.
G. The Marital Rape Exemption Presents Insurmountable
Problems of Proof
A more plausible justification for the marital rape exemption is that
problems with proving rape within a marriage are insurmountable. 123
Witnesses are unlikely to be found, but this is no justification for disal-
lowing a ravaged wife her constitutional right to seek a remedy at law.
Many crimes are difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is
not and never has been a sufficient reason to deny anyone the right to
bring a charge against their attacker when a crime has been commit-
ted.124 Admittedly, problems of proof are greatest when a wife accuses
her husband of rape; 125 however, this is still insufficient to be the sole
justification and criteria for supporting the marital rape exemption.
H. Alternative Remedies Available
Although remedies for other injuries to a woman's body are avail-
able, such as assault and battery, none of these remedies punishes for the
oppressive violence of the crime of rape. 126 Charges of assault or battery
do not reach the real violation of sexual autonomy inherent in rape. 127
The alternative remedies argument fails to recognize the fact that rape in
a marriage does not diminish the rights violated. 21 Moreover, these al-
ternative remedies fail to protect the wife from further abuse. A crime of
marital rape, however, would further the wife's need for protection from
her husband by providing for her husband's incarceration. Finally, the
argument ignores the grim reality of the difficulty working-class women
123. See Comment, supra note 73, at 724-25. For an in-depth discussion see Scutt, supra note
90, at 284-88.
124. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 18-19; Note, supra note 68, at 314. The fact that prosecu-
tions may be difficult is not a justified excuse to exclude wives from bringing charges. The Supreme
Court held that infrequent use of a law does not "bear on the continuing validity of the law. ..
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100, 117 (1953).
125. See Comment, supra note 73, at 724-25. The marriage relationship itself gives an inference
of consent and consent is admittedly most difficult to disprove when parties have had previous sexual
relations. See Comment, Spousal Exemption, supra note 7, at 125.
126. Freeman, supra note 12, at 15, 20-21; Comment, supra note 73, at 720-21; Note, supra note
68, at 316. "[R]ape is not just matrimonial misconduct It may leave emotional and psychological
scars or lead to the birth of a child. It is an offense of sufficient moment for women to be able to
claim the protection of the criminal law." Freeman, supra note 12, at 21.
127. Freeman, supra note 12, at 15 (rape's emotional trauma is more than that of the bodily
injury of an assault-it is an outrage to the psyche of a woman).
128. See Note, supra note 68, at 316.
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encounter in setting up a new home and bringing divorce proceedings
against their husbands; notwithstanding the fact that it is also unlikely a
divorce would shield the wife from further abuse. 129
I. Martal Rape Less Heinous Crime
Another justification offered for the marital rape exemption is that
rape when performed by a spouse is less serious than when performed by
a stranger. 130 This justification, however, rests on an assumption which
tends to ignore the fact that either marital rape or rape by an acquain-
tance "often leads to far more severe adjustment problems than a brutal,
back-alley gang rape, irrespective of any socio-demographic differences
among victims.' 13' In most cases, a marital or acquaintance rape will be
more traumatic for the victim than stranger rape.132
Moreover, when one is raped by a stranger one must live with a
horrid memory, but when one is raped by a spouse one must live with
both the memory and the rapist.'3 3 Furthermore, research has shown
that marital rape is often more violent and traumatic for the victim. t34
Finally, psychologists agree that a marriage magnifies the traumatic ef-
fects on a rape victim. 35
Marriage does not mitigate rape's trauma because rape is a crime of
violence--"injury and outrage to the feelings of the woman by the force-
129. Freeman, supra note 12, at 20. The fear of a divorced woman whose rapist ex-husband is
free can be likened to the fear of a single woman whose rapist is at large.
Women abused by their husbands often have no remedy at all. Gelles, No Place to Go: The
Social Dynamics of Marital Violence, in BATrERED WoMEN 46 (M. Roy ed. 1977). "The conven-
tional wisdom suggests that a woman who is beaten by her husband and stays with him is a maso-
chist or mentally ill. This 'wisdom' is based on the assumption that any reasonable person, having
been beaten, would avoid being hit again." Id. at 59. On the contrary, however, women are often
less educated, earn less money, and feel responsible for their children. 'Thus, in a violent confronta-
tion where the first reaction must be to flee, women realize that they have few places to flee to and
few resources to aid in their flight. Moreover, ifa woman leaves without her children, she is stigma-
tized as a neglectful mother (the same is not true for men who leave their families-they are simply
'deserters')." Id. at 61.
130. T. McCAimiL, L. MEYER & A. FiscHmAN, THE AxrEanATH oF RAPE 3, 61 (1979). For
example, rape by one's husband is often assumed to be less serious than a brutal rape of a lone
woman by a stranger in a deserted alley at night.
131. Id at 61.
132. I ; see Rickenberg & Schulman, supra note 62, at 745. But see Harman, supra note 11, at
439-41. Harman suggests that a prior sexual relationship with the rapist may decrease the victim's
"situational" distress, but increase the victim's "reactive" distress.
133. See Comment, supra note 62, at 209.
134. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 167, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15, 474 N.E.2d at 574-75. See generally D.
RussELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 190-99 (1982).
135. See Comment, supra note 62, at 209.
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ful penetration of her person. ' 136 This theory is supported by the severe
penalties associated with rape when contrasted with the lesser penalties
for assault and battery. Rape is viewed as more harmful than assault
because rape humiliates the victim and may cause the victim to "suffer
permanent emotional repercussions... [which] are impossible to calcu-
late." 137 The marital rape victim usually suffers more trauma than other
rape victims. 13 ' Therefore, a rape within the confines of marriage is no
less serious or heinous than stranger rape merely because the victim and
rapist are married.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Even if one were to accept any single policy argument as sufficient
grounds for sustaining the marital rape exemptions, the inquiry would
not be complete. The constitutional problems inherent in nearly all rape
statutes must also be examined and analyzed before the marital rape ex-
emption could be justified. The constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws and the constitutional right to privacy arguably threaten the
constitutionality of the marital rape exemption.
A. The Marital Rape Exemption Violates Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution guar-
antees that individuals who are similarly situated will be similarly
treated.' 39 The equal protection clause does not prevent discrimination;
it requires that a classification cannot be arbitrary, cannot unfairly re-
strict fundamental rights, and cannot be founded on discriminatory crite-
ria."4 Specifically, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. ,"
14 1
The Constitution grants each citizen the right to equal protection of
the laws, therefore, statutory schemes which deny identical treatment for
136. Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, 384, 155 N.E.2d 187, 191-92, cert denied,
359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
137. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, _, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (1977).
138. See Comment, supra note 62, at 209.
139. L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITTONAL LAW 993 (1978).
140. See Clancy, supra note 63, at 8.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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identical acts are ripe1 42 for equal protection challenges. 143 A statute
which treats males and females differently violates the equal protection
clause unless the statute's classification scheme is substantially related to
an important governmental interest.144
Classifications based on marital status, those which treat married
individuals differently from unmarried individuals for the same crime,
are subject to the middle tier scrutiny afforded gender classifications. 145
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"' the Supreme Court found a classification
scheme discriminating against unmarried persons to be unconstitu-
142. Although few defendants have succeeded in proving that rape statutes violate the equal
protection clause, many have challenged rape statutes on equal protection grounds. See, eg.,
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181,
526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 935 (1975); People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982),
appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); Brown, 632 P.2d at 1025; People v. Gould, 188 Colo. 113, 532
P.2d 953 (1975); People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973); State v. Kuahulia, 617 P.2d
826, 830 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980); State v. Rivera, 62 Hawaii 120, 612 P.2d 526 (1980); State v.
LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982); State v. Greensweig, 103 Idaho 50, 644 P.2d 372 (1982);
and Mahorney v. State, 664 P.2d 1042 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Eg., Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564
F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978); Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636, 640
(8th Cir. 1980); Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 207, 474 N.E.2d at 567.
143. See Clancy, supra note 63, at 3.
144. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Gender
discrimination within the Selective Service was sanctioned in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 63
(1981). "Congress acted well within its constitutional authority when it authorized the registration
of men, and not women, under the Military Selective Service Act." Id. at 83. Conversely, gender
discrimination was not sanctioned in police promotion policies. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595
F.2d 1367, 1385 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980). "Exclusion of all women from
regular police patrol duties and from promotions above the level of sergeant was not substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. Because women could have
served as effective police officers during this period, we can only conclude that the dual classification
system was designed to serve administrative convenience and not to promote the maintenance of an
effective police force. Thus, the gender-based classification system violated the equal protection
clause, and appellees were not entitled to summary judgment on this portion of the constitutional
claim." Id.
The asserted important governmental interest of preventing pregnancy of young women, has
proved to be insufficient to support a gender-based statute, because allowing men to be charged with
rape and not women is not substantially related to the important governmental interest of preventing
pregnancy. Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1980). "Because the state has failed
to show that its gender-based classification substantially furthers the prevention of physical injury,
emotional trauma, or pregnancy caused by sexual intercourse with an older person, we hold that the
provision of the Iowa statute in question violates the equal protection clause." Id. at 641. Contra
Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495, 503 (1st Cir. 1979) (statutory rape statute's classification satisfied
equal protection challenge because the classification was substantially related to achievement of an
important governmental interest in protecting young females from "physical injury resulting from
sexual intercourse" which the court determined was "uniquely suffered by young females .... ).
145. "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gen-
der must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). The Court
held, "[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the
challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
146. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 21 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss2/4
MARITAL RAPE
tional.' 47 In Eisenstadt, Baird appealed a conviction for giving an un-
married adult woman contraceptive foam. 148 The Court held that the
statute by preventing such distribution to single persons violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 49 Clearly, the
fundamental right of marriage alone was insufficient to sustain a classifi-
cation scheme differentiating between married and unmarried persons.
More than a decade after Eisenstadt5° was decided, a lower court
held that New York's marital rape exemption violated the rights of mar-
ried women.'' The landmark case, People v. De Stefano,"2 was the first
to analyze the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption. In De
Stefano, the court rejected all of the traditional policy arguments for sus-
taining the marital rape exemption and found there was no governmental
interest protected by the marital rape exemption.15 3
Other courts that have considered equal protection challenges to
their marital rape exemptions have steadfastly held to the argument that
only females can become pregnant and it is the pregnancy prevention of
young, often unwed, women which is the state's primary legitimate inter-
est. 154 In Olson v. State,15 5 the court emphasized the obvious, that fe-
males can become pregnant while males cannot, in order to show the
gender-based classification was substantially related to the achievement
of the governmental objective and therefore within constitutional lim-
its.' 56 The courts following this rationale, however, failed to analyze the
definition for the crime of rape. If rape is defined only as intercourse,
then arguably the prevention of pregnancy would be substantially related
147. Id.
148. Id at 440.
149. Id. at 443. The Court quoted Reed, 404 U.S. at 76: "A classification must be 'reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 (citation omitted); see generally Comment, Rape Laws, Equal Protection,
and P vacy Rights, 54 Tr. L. REv. 456 (1980).
150. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438.
151. People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983). In this case, defendant
husband moved out of the home but later violated a temporary order of protection by raping his wife
at knifepoinL The defendant then tried to show his constitutional right to be exempt from the crime
of rape upon his wife under the marital exemption. Id at _ 467 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
152. 121 Misc. 2d 113, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1983).
153. See Rickenberg & Schulman, supra note 62, at 745.
154. Olson v. State, 95 Nev. 1, 588 P.2d 1018 (1979); State v. Young, 11 Wash. App. 398, 523
P.2d 946 (1974).
155. 95 Nev. 1, 588 P.2d 1018 (1979). In Olson, the defendant appealed a statutory rape convic-
tion on the theory "that the statute invidiously discriminates against males by proscribing consen-
sual rape of a female by a male while failing to proscribe consensual rape of a male by a female." Id.
at . 588 P.2d at 1019.
156. Olson, 95 Nev. at - 588 P.2d at 1019; cf Meloon, 564 F.2d at 604.
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to the achievement of the governmental objective of preventing inter-
course. However, because rape is not merely intercourse, but a crime of
violence by one against another, the statute's purpose should arguably be
to prevent the violent intrusion of a person's body. Thus, prevention of
pregnancy is not a governmental interest substantially related, nor ra-
tionally related, to the achievement of preventing violence and intrusion.
Another argument used in equal protection challenges of marital
rape exemptions is that women cannot rape men."5 7 While the majority
of sexual attacks have been by men upon women,15 8 if rape is defined as
any penetration, however slight, a man can be raped by force without his
consent.
Many courts have upheld gender-based rape statutes upon finding
an important governmental interest that is substantially related to the
gender-based classification scheme.1 59 Ultimately, however, courts have
realized that these rationales will no longer withstand equal protection
scrutiny. As a result, a trend of holdings that statutes with marital rape
exemptions violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment has emerged. 16° The change, however, will be slow if state legisla-
tures do not respond first, because many courts are extremely hesitant to
declare statutes unconstitutional.
B. The Marital Rape Exemption Violates the Right to Privacy
The marital rape exemption violates the constitutional right of pri-
vacy as well as equal protection. This second constitutional considera-
tion, the right to privacy, emanates from the Bill of Rights. 1 ' Although
an express right to privacy is not contained in the Bill of Rights, the
157. State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976). "Historically such attacks have been
by men upon women." The court held that some inequality in gender classifications does not render
the statute unconstitutional 'unless those similarly classified are treated differently or the classifica-
tions are arbitrary." Id at .., 545 P.2d at 653. The court further noted that even under a gender-
based statute, a woman could be convicted for assault. In 1975, Montana amended the statutory
language in order to eliminate the gender distinction. Id, 545 P.2d at 653.
158. Id at _ 545 P.2d at 653.
159. Courts have upheld gender-based statutes which made it a crime for a male to rape a fe-
male, but did not similarly protect males from a female rapist. See, eg., Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526
P.2d 720; Flowers, 644 P.2d 916; Brown, 632 P.2d 1025; Gould, 188 Colo. 113, 532 P.2d 953; Green,
183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769; Rivera, 62 Hawaii 120, 612 P.2d 526; Lamere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d
46; Greensweig, 103 Idaho 50, 644 P.2d 372; Mahorney, 664 P.2d 1042.
160. See Meloon, 564 F.2d at 609 (court held specific statute which extended punishment for
rape that involved only female victims violated the fourteenth amendment).
161. U.S. CONST. amends. IX.
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Supreme Court stated in Griswold v. Connecticut'62 that many of the Bill
of Rights guarantees protect an individual's interest in privacy and
thereby create a "penumbra" of privacy.'63
Seven years after Griswold, the Supreme Court expanded the mean-
ing of the Griswold holding in Eisenstadt.'6 In Eisenstadt, the Court ex-
tended the right of privacy to include an unmarried person's right to use
contraceptives. The Court stated that if a ban on the distribution of con-
traceptives to married persons was unconstitutional, then a ban on distri-
bution to unmarried persons would also be unconstitutional. 165  More
importantly, the Court acknowledged that the right of privacy includes
the right of individuals, married or single, to be free from governmental
intervention in an individual's decision to procreate. 16
6
Finally, the landmark case of Roe v. Wade'67 expanded the right of
privacy to include the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy.
This right, however, "is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests.' 68 When the health of the mother or the fetus
"becomes significantly involved,"' 169 the woman's right to privacy can be
subject to state intervention. Hence, although a woman's right to privacy
does not preclude all state intervention, in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,170 the Supreme Court barred states from giving a pregnant wo-
man's husband an absolute right to veto her decision to have an
abortion.' 7 ' Both the Roe and Planned Parenthood decisions rest upon
the premise that women are individuals and are therefore entitled to their
162. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). At issue were two Connecticut statutes which prohibited the sale of
contraceptives and counseling of persons in their use and application. Id at 480.
163. Id at 484-85. The court struck down the statutes with a majority of seven and held that the
right of married persons to use contraceptives fell within the "penumbra" of privacy. Id at 485.
164. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438.
165. Id at 453.
166. Id
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relation-
ship. Yet, the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id at 453 (emphasis in original); accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
'This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 414
U.S. at 639-40.
167. 410 U.S. 113, 153, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
168. Id. at 154.
169. Id at 159.
170. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
171. Id at 69.
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own individual right to privacy, separate and apart from their husband's
rights. Hence, it is the individual, not the marital relationship, that pos-
sesses the overriding right to privacy.172
An individual's right to bodily privacy was set forth by the Supreme
Court as early as 1891: "No right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his [or her] own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others."'173 Further support for an individual's
right to bodily privacy was provided in Carey v. Population Services In-
ternational 174 In Carey, the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy
also included the decision to conceive a child.175
The marital rape exemption, like the statute in Carey which prohib-
ited distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to persons under sixteen
years of age, impinges upon a woman's individual decision whether or
not to conceive a child. Therefore, statutes affording marital rape ex-
emptions must serve a compelling state interest. 76 Yet, even if a compel-
ling state interest could be asserted to justify the marital rape exemption,
it is unlikely that any legitimate state interest could be fostered by al-
lowing sexual violence in a marriage. Moreover, since each individual
has a right to privacy, the state would have a conflict of interest in pro-
tecting a spouse's individual rights to privacy and at the same time a
marital right to privacy. 177
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has set forth both an individual
right to privacy and a marital right to privacy. The state's interest in
protecting the individuals' right to privacy and its interest in protecting
the right of marital privacy established in Griswold178 do not conflict, but
are coextensive interests. This is because the right to marital privacy
confirmed in Griswold encompassed the right to consensual sexual con-
172. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
173. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
174. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
175. Id. at 688-89. Because the right to privacy included the right to decide whether to bear a
child, access to contraceptives could not be prevented by the state. Id.; see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (court struck down an Oklahoma statute providing for the steriliza-
tion of certain prisoners because it interfered with the fundamental right to procreate).
176. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686. "[W]here a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or
beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling
state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests." Iat
177. See Comment, supra note 149, at 478.
178. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. The purpose of marital privacy is to promote marital harmony.
Id at 485-86. Griswold did not hold nonconsensual sexual assault to be free from state interference.
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duct in marriage without state intrusion.179 Consensual sexual conduct in
a marriage does not encompass the right to violent sexual assaults.
Therefore, marital rape, a nonconsensual sexual assault, is not free from
state interference. Thus, the Griswold holding taken in conjunction with
the Court's definition of an individual's privacy right,180 demonstrates
"that an individual's privacy interests outweigh marital privacy interests
when the two conflict."'' Clearly, the marital privacy interest cannot
outweigh the individual's interest.
When a husband rapes his wife, he invades the wife's personal right
to privacy.'182 In states that retain a marital rape exemption, the wife has
no remedy for the violation of her privacy. 8 1 Therefore, statutes which
afford the marital rape exemption violate a wife's right to privacy and are
unconstitutional unless the statute serves a compelling governmental in-
terest."8 4 As noted earlier, however, none of the traditional policy argu-
ments used to retain the marital rape exemption are plausible. In short,
because the state has no compelling governmental interest in permitting
marital rape,8 5 only statutes which eliminate the marital rape exemption
can withstand constitutional scrutiny based on the right to privacy.'
86
VI. STATUTORY RESPONSES
Although statutes with marital rape exemptions are likely unconsti-
tutional, marital rape law reform has been slow and legislators remain
indifferent. Unfortunately, even when legislatures have attempted some
reform, most have failed to achieve total abolition of the marital rape
exemption.' 8 7
Presently, three states still provide a complete exclusion for the
179. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Hilf, supra note 36, at 35-40; Comment, supra note 62, at
215.
180. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
181. See Comment, supra note 62, at 216; see also Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 67-72 (state
cannot require a husband's written consent before his wife can receive an abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. at
113 (a woman has the right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
453 (the right of privacy is an individual right whether the individual is married or single).
182. "Just as a husband cannot invoke a right of marital privacy to escape liability for beating
his wife, he cannot justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right to privacy." Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
183. The author asserts that the remedies provided through criminal assault and battery statutes
are insufficient to compensate for the more violent and harmful crime of rape.
184. See Comment, supra note 62, at 220.
185. Id. at 221.
186. See Comment, supra note 149, at 478-79.
187. See Bienen, supra note 3, at 209-13; Freeman, supra note 12, at 24. (Bienen argues that
rape law reform also has significant social implications because it educates the public about the
horror of rape).
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spouse from all types of spousal sexual assault crimes until the marriage
formally ends.' 8 Seven states, however, have completely reformed their
rape or sexual assault statutes to explicitly exclude the marital rape ex-
emption. 89 In comparison, thirteen states and the District of Columbia
have statutes which are silent on the issue.190
The sign of some statutory reform is evidenced by the fact that only
two states retain a simple codification of the common law offense of
rape' 91 which defined rape as the carnal knowledge of a woman by force
or threat of force. 192 Two additional statutes also fail to reflect the trend
of more comprehensive sexual assault statutes, referring only to rape
rather than to several categories of gradated sexual offenses.' 93
A number of states have partially reformed their rape or sexual as-
sault statutes. The partially reformed marital rape exemptions provide
that the marriage ceases to give a spouse an immunity from the crime of
rape when various factors indicate the marriage has dissolved. For ex-
ample, five state statutes provide that the spousal privilege is inoperative
when spouses are judicially separated.' 94 Another four states void the
marital rape exemption when the spouses are living apart and have filed
for divorce and separate maintenance. 95 Furthermore, five states disal-
188. A complete exclusion for any sexual assault can be found in CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53(a)-67(b) (West Supp. 1985); OIno REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1984); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1985).
189. Some statutes explicitly disallow the marital rape exemption. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 262 (West Supp. 1985) (statute provides a separate crime of spousal rape); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:5 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5.(b) (West 1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-6
(1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1985) (statute states "marriage not a bar to
prosecution"); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1983).
190. Many statutes are expressly silent on the marital rape exemption. ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.410 (1983); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(A) (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 767 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West Supp. 1985);
HAwAII REV. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (Supp. 1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Baldwin 1985);
MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. Cmp. LAWS § 750.520(b) (Supp.
1985); NE. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1979); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1982); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.040 (Supp. 1986).
191. Codification of the common law crime of rape appears in GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (Har-
rison 1983) and Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1984).
192. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 209.
193. Two statutes exclude spousal liability and refer only to rape, not other sexual assaults.
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(4), 13A-6-61 to 13A-6-62 (1982); S.D. CoDInED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1
(Supp. 1984).
194. Some statutes disallow the marital rape exemption when the spouses are judicially sepa-
rated. See, eg., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D
(1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010 (Vernon 1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (Supp. 1985).
195. Statutes which void the marital rape exemption when spouses are living apart and have filed
for divorce and separate maintenance include: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(3)(b) (Burns 1985);
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low the marital rape exemption even if the spouses are merely living
apart.196 Finally, the remaining nine states delineate specific require-
ments which must be satisfied before the spousal privilege is
disallowed.
197
Although a few statutes have been radically revised to explicitly dis-
allow a spousal privilege for rape, there is no plausible explanation for
the lack of total marital rape reform. 198 In the seven states which specifi-
cally nullified the marital rape exemption there has not been an abuse of
the enlightened law, nor has there been a "flood of prosecutions" or
"fabricated charges."'
19 9
VII. OKLAHOMA LAW
Despite the success of reformed marital rape laws in other states and
abroad, Oklahoma's rape law has been slow to change. Prior to an
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-610 (1982).
196. In some states the marital rape exemption is inoperative when marital partners are not
cohabiting. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1973) (marital rape exemption inoperative
when spouses intend to and do live apart); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1 to .4 (West 1979 & West Supp.
1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 252 (1983) (negative inference can be drawn from
§ 252(2)); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502, 45-5-511 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (1984)
(not considered spouse if living apart or if either has filed for separate maintenance or divorce).
197. Several statutes provide for alternative acts before the marital rape exemption is disallowed.
Aix. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1802 to 1803 (Supp. 1985) (definition of rape does not exclude spouse, but
other sexual offenses do specifically exclude spouse); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979) (marital rape
exemption applies unless a spouse has initiated either divorce or separation proceedings, or spouses
have lived apart 180 days); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975-1984) (action
allowed if judicial order, decree of separation, or acknowledged written agreement of separation);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1981) (not liable for sexual assault unless parties are living separately
pursuant to a written agreement or judicial decree); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (Supp. 1983)
(spousal privilege inoperative if spouses live apart under judicial separation decree, protection order,
or interim order in connection with a divorce or separation action); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1111 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (marital rape exemption inoperative if petition for divorce is pend-
ing; petition for legal separation is pending or was granted; petition for protective order is pending;,
or if spouses are living apart); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (spousal privilege
inoperative if spouses live apart or if they live together under a separation agreement or judicial
court order); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2.1 (Supp. 1985) (not liable for first degree sexual assault if
couple is living apart "and a decision for divorce has been granted, whether or not a final decree has
been entered"); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (no marital rape exemption
if spouses "do not reside together or if there is an action pending between them for dissolution of the
marriage or for separate maintenance.").
198. Glasgow, supra note 86, at 582.
199. Id. Moreover, the case for total abolition of the marital rape exemption is strengthened by
the fact that many foreign jurisdictions do not exempt the spouse from rape prosecution. Further-
more, these countries have not suffered adversely. Husbands can be prosecuted for rape in Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 26. In Sweden husbands are
liable for marital rape, but receive a less harsh sentence than strangers who rape. Id at 26-27.
Eleven years after the Swedish law was changed, a report examining the new law found that
although the law was seldom used the reform was necessary. See Glasgow, supra note 86, at 583.
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amendment effective November 1, 1984,2 ° Oklahoma provided the
spouse with a complete marital rape exemption 2 1- "a husband could
never be prosecuted for rape of his wife, even when the parties were sepa-
rated pursuant to court order. '2 2
In 1984, Oklahoma's marital rape law took a small, informed step
forward by expressly providing that a spouse can be prosecuted for rape
if he used or threatened to use force or violence and if there is a pending
divorce petition, a pending petition for legal separation, a pending peti-
tion for a protective order, or if the victim and spouse are living apart.20 3
This reform in Oklahoma's law made it possible for a husband to receive
criminal punishment for raping his wife if the parties were not cohabiting
or if a legal action had been initiated.' 4
Oklahoma's recent statutory reform is encouraging, but it is not a
panacea. Justice demands more reform. The traditional reasons for up-
holding the marital rape exemption are no longer valid. Even if they
were valid, the constitutional right to equal protection and privacy are
hurdles the statute would have to overcome. Thus, Oklahoma's rape
statute still needs more reform-a reform which would completely abol-
ish the marital rape exemption and also satisfy the inevitable equal pro-
tection and privacy challenges.
VIII. A SUGGESTED STATUTORY SCHEME
Clearly, a new statutory scheme which would arguably avoid all of
the archaic policy justifications and explicitly provide punishment for
marital rape is needed not only in Oklahoma, but throughout the nation.
Furthermore, the most enlightened approach would settle equal protec-
200. See Rickenberg & Schulman, supra note 62, at 749.
201. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (1981). As late as April 15, 1981, the Oklahoma senate re-jected an amendment by the house to create the crime of marital rape in Oklahoma. Eg., Richard-
son, An Analysis of Oklahoma's New Rape Statutes, 52 OKLA. B.I 2482 (1981) (the article discusses
Oklahoma's rape statutes as of 1981 only).
202. See Rickenberg & Schulman, supra note 62, at 749-50.
203. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1984-1985) added part B to allow for a
partial marital rape exemption.
B. Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a male or female who is the
spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or threatened, accompanied by appar-
ent power of execution to the victim or to another person and if:
1. A petition for divorce is pending; or
2. A petition for legal separation is pending or has been granted; or
3. A petition for a protective order as provided for by the provisions of Section 60.2 of
Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes is pending; or
4. The victim and perpetrator are living separate and apart from each other.
Id
204. Rickenberg & Schulman, supra note 62, at 749.
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tion problems with a gender-neutral sexual offense statute which pun-
ishes both men and women for any penetration, however slight, and for
all other deviant sex crimes.
An example of this enlightened statutory approach can be found in
New Hampshire's statute which outlines sexual assaults and related of-
fenses.20 New Hampshire's statute is gender-neutral and specifically dis-
allows the traditional marital rape exemption. This is evident in that the
perpetrator is defined as a "person," either a man or woman, accused of
sexual assault.20 6 Thus, both male and female victims are afforded equal
protection under the law.
The statute should also provide for appropriate gradated penalties
for varying levels of sexual assault. Under the New Hampshire statute
punishment is heightened for "sexual penetration" under the crime of
aggravated felonious sexual assault.207 Punishment is correspondingly
diminished for an actor who has sexual contact with a young victim, but
not penetration.208 The least punishment is afforded an actor who sub-
jects a person merely to sexual contact. 20 9
Most importantly, however, the statute explicitly states that "[a]n
actor commits a crime under this chapter even though the victim is the
actor's legal spouse.1210 This specific language leaves no doubt that the
common law marital rape exemption is no longer part of New Hamp-
shire's law. New Hampshire's statute is exemplary. Oklahoma and
many other states should reform their rape laws to gradated, gender-
neutral sexual assault statutes, like that of New Hampshire.
IX. CONCLUSION
The grim reality of legally-sanctioned marital rape remains in all but
a few progressive states. Ironically, the legacy of Hale's flippant and un-
founded statement that a husband cannot rape his wife2 ' continues to
ravage American women.
205. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1983).
632-A:5 Spouse as Victim; Evidence of Husband and Wife. An actor commits a crime
under this chapter even though the victim is the actor's legal spouse. Laws attaching a
privilege against the disclosure of communications between husband and wife are inappli-
cable to proceedings under this chapter.
Id.
206. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:1 (Supp. 1983).
207. Id § 632-A:2.
208. Id § 632-A:3.
209. Id § 632-A:4.
210. Id § 632-A:5.
211. See HALE, supra note 6, at 629.
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Unfortunately, however, even though the case for total reform of
archaic American rape laws is compelling, most courts are unwilling to
take the role of judicial legislators to correct the evils fostered by the
marital rape exemption. Thus, the task of statutory reform is relegated
to state legislatures.
All legislatures should provide some reform and design a gender-
neutral sexual offense statute. The author advocates a statute which:
(1) is gender-neutral; (2) has gradated punishments by categories of sex-
ual assault and (3) expressly provides that the perpetrator is liable for
marital rape.212 In following these three statutory guidelines, a new stat-
utory scheme would punish a crime of violence, not a crime of sex. Fur-
thermore, it would provide that violent sexual assault on an unwilling
victim is illegal, and can no longer be protected behind the guise of the
marital bond.213 Marital rape is not a less heinous crime:
Rape is rape. The identity of the rapist does not alter the fact of his
act, nor lessen its traumatic effects on his victim. The marital status of
the parties involved should have no bearing on the definition of the
crime of rape any more than it should on the crime of battery .... I
believe our society is now plagued with violence because it is allowed
to run rampant in the family home.214
Rape within marriage is a violent and heinous crime destined to
continue without punishment if state legislatures do not abolish the mari-
tal rape exemption and provide for prosecutions of marital rape. More-
over, American legislatures and courts must first acknowledge rape for
what it is-a crime of violence to which no individual, married or single,
should be subjected.
Geri Coen
212. The fact that New Hampshire's statute expicity provides that an actor can be criminally
liable for rape of his spouse is important. This express language will quash arguments that the
statute was silent on the issue because it was not intended to punish spouses.
213. See Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1129.
214. D. MARTiN, supra note 1, at 181.
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